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Abstract: Right populism in the United States and in the European Union is one of 
the leading trends in their political reality. That is why we need to structurize our 
understanding of this phenomenon by listing its main indicators and by explaining 
its causal background. What seems to belong to the leading determinants of the phe-
nomenon is: the hostility toward immigration, the perception of multinational compa-
nies as a threat to local labor markets, a postulate to reduce bureaucracy, anti-elitism, 
another understanding of international politics combined with a new opening in the 
relations with Russia.
Various right populist movements result from several determinants such as a sig-
nificant increase of immigration in Europe, the growth of national debt, expanding 
bureaucracy, growing importance of international corporations, a flood of terrorist 
attacks or negative demographic tendencies.
The ideology of right populism can be referred to two different traditions: to individu-
alist libertarianism (which partially determines the ideology of the Tea Party and some 
other American movements) and to alt-right, collectivist, tribal traditionalism, which 
is more common in the Old Continent.
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Introduction
The purpose of this article is to contribute to the understanding of a widespread but vaguely defined phenomenon usually described as 
right-wing populism within the Western democracies, at the dawn of the 
third millennium. What has to be admitted is the significant impact of 
right-wing populist ideologies on the political reality in the EU and on the 
other side of the Atlantic, which results from mental transformations in 
Europe and in the US. There is a necessity for a structural description of 
the doctrinal base (in other words, for a comprehensive conceptual sum-
mary of the phenomenon based on a synthetic overview) on the one hand, 
and for a possible social justification of the new tendencies on the other.
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The topic has already been discussed in several publications, includ-
ing the leading monographs: Betz & Immerfal (1998), Mudde & Rovira 
Kaltwasser (2012) and Fielitz & Laloire (2016). The authors usually 
concentrate on the analysis of particular cases of right-wing populism. 
However, in a smaller number of studies one can find some causal and 
structural generalizations, such as in the paper of Arbatova et al. (2016) 
concerning right- and left-wing populism in EU states.
There are several theoretical problems that may appear while con-
sidering a synthetic and causal study of the question. Although the need 
for such an attempt is not questioned, the theoretical framework is an 
arguable matter, since it can either be withdrawn from the structure of 
the doctrines, or rely on the social and economic context of the states in 
question. Moreover, the conclusions may take either the shape of an in-
ductive synthesis, a generalization based on observed cases or a form of 
deductive speculation. There are good reasons for each of the approaches. 
The necessity to return to political reality is beyond doubt, and that is the 
reason for presenting some exemplary cases of right-wing populism as 
an obvious point of reference. On the other hand, however, it also makes 
sense to create a conceptual structure of right-wing populism both as 
a generalization of ideas and as a set of possible ideological options that 
might be used by any populists as devices of political manipulation.
Right-wing populism is by no means a sudden or a new phenome-
non. The shocks caused by the new right have been observed since the 
late 1970s. Surprisingly, one could detect them on both sides of the iron 
curtain. In the USSR, a leftist totalitarian empire, the late years of the 
Brezhnev era were marked by the appearance of Pamyat – the first new 
conservative nationalist organization, which evolved from a historical as-
sociation Vityaz, promoted by the Soviet Society for the Protection of 
Historical and Cultural Monuments (cf. Brudny, 2000, pp. 204ff.).
The Western world (the one that stems from Catholicism and Protestant-
ism), seemed not to have convincing reasons for rightist populism: techno-
logical development transformed the United States and the uniting Europe 
into unquestionably well-prospering and attractive partners. The world 
economic system was designed according to American and European ex-
pectations. The “wonder years” of counterculture left the memories of wars 
behind. After the end of the cold war the integrative processes went on, 
making NATO and the EU grow bigger and extending the area of Western 
influence and relative stability. However, the following years witnessed the 
emergence of new tendencies on both sides of the Atlantic.
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A bird’s eye view on right-wing populism in the US
In the United States, the new rightist positions (after the McCarthy-
ism of the 1950s) were represented most strikingly by groups and think-
ers representing the trend of paleoconservatism. Paleocons such as Pat 
Buchanan, Russell Kirk, Tom Tancredo and Paul Gottfried were for many 
years considered to be the main protectors of the values promoted by tra-
ditional white America: family, limited government, Jeffersonian federal-
ism, religious identity and civil society (based on individual initiative and 
independence). Paleoconservatists never had a single, vertically organ-
ized party, which in a way corresponds with their anti-centralism. Their 
political views were represented by such movements as the American 
Party of the United States, the Constitution Party, America’s Party (pre-
viously America’s Independent Party), the America Freedom Party (that 
emerged from the American Third Position Party), the Christian Liberty 
Party and the Independent American Party. None of them ever played an 
important part in real politics.
A phenomenon of much bigger importance is the Tea Party, a conserv-
ative movement associated much more often with the Republican Party 
than with the Democrats. Its ideology oscillates around the reduction of 
taxes and state deficit. TP activists strongly opposed Obamacare (The Pa-
tient Protection and Affordable Care Act), which was clearly responsible 
for the enormous growth of America’s national debt. According to Bow-
man & Marsico (2014), at least 10% of the American population adhere 
to the ideas of the Tea Party, which means that we are dealing with a real 
power.
Halloran (2010) suggests that the Tea Party rightist “populism” is a re-
sult of the failure in solving the country’s economic and social problems 
during the Democratic period in the White House. However, a look into 
TP slogans and the ideologies of paleoconservative parties allows one to 
say that in fact we are coming up against a predominant libertarian turn 
in the rightist regions of the American political stage. It is obvious that the 
purest representation of this doctrine is to be found in the manifesto of the 
Libertarian Party, which is not a completely unimportant phenomenon, 
especially if we consider the fact that the Libertarian candidate for US 
presidency in 2016 received 3.28% in the popular vote, which placed him 
right behind Clinton (48.18%) and Trump (46.09%).
However, libertarian ideas are widely represented in the manifestos 
of the other right-wing American parties and movements, including the 
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highly influential Tea Party as well. Most of the 15 TP’s “Non-negotiable 
Core Beliefs” refer directly to libertarian values:
“4. Special interests must be eliminated.
 5. Gun ownership is sacred.
 6. Government must be downsized.
 7. The national budget must be balanced.
 8. Deficit spending must end.
 9. Bailout and stimulus plans are illegal.
10. Reducing personal income taxes is a must.
11. Reducing business income taxes is mandatory. [...]
13. Intrusive government must be stopped” (Webteaparty, 2017).
However, some of the Tea Party’s core beliefs belong to another stream 
of the political right, not necessarily compatible with liberal values:
“1. Illegal aliens are here illegally.
 2. Pro-domestic employment is indispensable.
 3. A strong military is essential.
[...]
12. Political offices must be available to average citizens.
[...]
14. English as our core language is required.
15. Traditional family values are encouraged” (Webteaparty, 2017).
The other face of contemporary right-wing populist ideology was de-
scribed by Gottfried (2008) as the alternative right (alt-right), which em-
braces such ideas as white supremacism (or even white nationalism, rep-
resented most visibly by Richard Spencer), islamophobia, antisemitism, 
homophobia and antifeminism (directed not against women but against 
extreme feminism). The media platform for the trend is provided by the 
Altright.com website and some partners such as Arktos, Radix Journal or 
Red Ice TV. Shapiro (2016) with no hesitation accuses Breitbart News of 
embracing the white supremacist Alt-Right as well. Apart from Spencer 
(accompanied by his colleagues such as Daniel Friberg, Jason Jorjani, 
Henrik Palmgren, William Regnery, Hunter Wallace and Tor Westman) 
Weigel (2016) mentions Peter Brimelow and Jared Taylor as the other 
main representatives of the movement.
The difference of the two spirits, which are equally labeled as “rightist” 
or even “right-wing populist” are concisely described by Tucker (2016), 
who points out important differences between libertarianism and some 
dominating trends in the alt-right phenomenon. First of all, a libertarian 
emphasizes the fact that “libertarianism speaks of individual choice, alt-
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right theory draws attention to collectives on the move.” In other words, 
the alt-rights continue the tradition of rabid collectivist visionaries, in-
cluding nationalists, fascists or elitists, such as Hegel, Carlyle, Gentile or 
Schmitt. Secondly, libertarian thinking stems from a belief in the possible 
harmony among people, whereas alt-right realism is rooted in the idea 
of unavoidable conflict. Thirdly, “the libertarian believes that the best 
and most wonderful social outcomes are not those planned, structured, 
and anticipated, but rather the opposite” while in the alt-right concep-
tion society “is built by the will of great thinkers and great leaders with 
unconstrained visions of what can be. What we see out there operating in 
society is a result of someone’s intentional and conscious planning from 
the top down. If we cannot find the source, or if the source is somehow 
hiding, we imagine that it must be some shadowy group out there that is 
manipulating outcomes – and hence the alt-right’s obsession with con-
spiracy theory. The course of history is designed by someone, so ‘we’ 
might as well engage in the great struggle to seize the controls – and 
hence the alt-right obsession with politics as a contact sport.” Fourthly, 
a libertarian supports free trade and migration of people, whereas for the 
alternative rightists the internal market should be protected and free mi-
gration causes a threat to national identity. Last but not least, one should 
note the libertarian admiration of progress and, contrary to that, the alt-
right fear of the loss of culture, identity and mission.
Even if one does not accept Tucker’s synthesis entirely, it is clear that 
alt-right is alternative to traditional right-wing individualism thanks to 
a kind of a “tribal” or “mobilization” instinct, and alternative to the left 
counter-movements because of preaching a war against such things as 
the destruction of national culture by immigration, moral degradation, 
decomposition of families or traditional patriotism, etc. The American 
right-turn is in a way paradoxical, with its cult of limited government and 
individual initiative explained in terms of tribal or religious imperatives.
Selected cases of right-wing populism in Europe
The American reaction against deep-rooted liberalism was accompa-
nied by analogous phenomena in the Old Continent. The beginnings were 
obviously different than in the US with its McCarthy’s witch hunt: Eu-
rope was permeated with the feeling of post-war security guaranteed by 
American military forces. For half a century after WW2, Western Europe 
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grew as a uniting continent characterized by relative well being and polit-
ical stability, with only temporary turbulences such as the events of 1968 
in France. If there was a real populist alternative, it typically appeared on 
the left side of the political stage.
The situation began to change after the first traumatic experience with 
mass immigration. The first steps were made in Austria, which should 
probably be studied as a separate case, because its main right-wing popu-
list party – the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Öster-
reichs, FPÖ) was founded as early as in 1956. Such early beginnings can 
probably be explained by the resentment caused by the Soviet occupa-
tion, which was much less efficient in denazification proceedings than the 
Western partners.
The FPÖ’s ideology focuses on the Heimat, the homeland, which 
ought to be protected both in an economic and cultural sense. That is why 
the party has always been highly sensitive to the immigration question: an 
inflow of newcomers is associated with the demolition of the welfare state 
and of the Teutonic character of the nation. As far as the national question 
is concerned, the FPÖ originally resorted to a sort of Pan-Germanism: in 
the party’s manifesto the Austrian nation is described as predominantly 
German with “integrated minorities” (see: Parteiprogram, 2017) How-
ever, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the party became euro-skeptical and 
turned to Austrian nationalism. It is no surprise that the party’s ideology 
is generally anti-Islamic, pointing out the problem of the growing share of 
Muslims in a traditionally German-speaking and Christian population.
The manifesto contains a limited input of libertarian ideas, saying that: 
“Freedom is our most valued asset. Since the civil revolution in 1848 we 
have dedicated ourselves to the struggle for freedom, and to defend it 
wherever necessary if what we have achieved comes under threat.” How-
ever, the collectivist content is much stronger, referring to such impera-
tives as national identity, traditional family, necessity for proper public 
health care, protection of law and security.
In the area of international relations, the FPÖ’s vision of Europe boils 
down to “an association of free peoples and autonomous nations.” What 
can open Austria to the world is only its sovereignty and freedom. The 
party’s manifesto also “supports the interests of the German and Ladin 
linguistic minorities in Southern Tyrol and the interests of all German 
native speakers from the territories of the former Habsburg monarchy” 
(Parteiprogram, 2017). The FPÖ signed an agreement with the Kremlin’s 
United Russia party, which probably resulted from the fact that the present 
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party leader, Heinz-Christian Strache, sought support among tough, con-
servative politicians, whereas the Russian political elite sought another 
opportunity to weaken European unity. Coincidentally, the FPÖ’s support 
for the German-speaking minorities in the territory of the former empire 
is almost a carbon copy of the “Russian World” (Russkiy Mir, a commu-
nity of all people related to Russian culture)
The FPÖ is by no means a minor political entity in Austria. The results 
it gained in the elections to the National Council varied over the decades, 
reaching 26.9% in 1999, when the party’s leadership was in the hands of 
Jörg Haider, the governor of Carinthia. Haider was one of the most con-
troversial Austrian politicians in the post-war period because of his pro-
Nazi sympathies (he was the son of early NSDAP members). In 1999, the 
FPÖ achieved 27.5% in the elections to the European Parliament. After 
Haider’s death, and massive criticism in the media, results dropped dras-
tically in the following elections at all levels. However, since that disas-
trous downfall the party’s position has been steadily improving. Accord-
ing to a Research Affairs poll in December 2017, the FPÖ was expected 
to achieve 35%, which is the highest level of popularity for the party in its 
long history (see: Austria, December 2016 Research Affairs poll).
The second position belongs to France, where Jean-Marie Le Pen 
founded the National Front (Front National) in 1972, handing down 
leadership to his daughter Marine only in 2011. The FN’s manifesto, 
which has had several incarnations in recent decades, invariably aims at 
such things as:
the withdrawal of France from the EU, especially from the eurozone  –
and Schengen;
drastic limitations put on immigration, and deportations of illegal im- –
migrants as well as of new arrivals who break the law;
the protection of French industrial and agricultural production, as  –
well as of services (the last element provoked the irrational “Polish 
plumber threat”);
a tough approach to crime; –
dialog with Russia and withdrawal from sanctions. –
All these topics were consistently exploited in Marine Le Pen’s presi-
dential campaign (cf. Les 144 engagements présidentiels, 2017). How-
ever, her father criticized the selection of the imperatives of the campaign, 
suggesting that the European topic should have yielded to more important 
issues such as immigration and the internal destruction of the country in 
the spheres of economy and national identity (cf. Rose, 2017).
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The popularity of Front National and its leaders varied over the dec-
ades. In elections to the National Assembly, the best result to date was 
achieved in 1997 (14.9%), whereas in the presidential elections Jean-
Marie le Pen managed to get to the 2nd round in 2002 with only 17.8% 
support. Marine Le Pen was much more successful, gaining 21.3% in the 
first round of the elections in April/May, 2017 only to lose in the end, 
receiving a third of the votes in her struggle against Emmanuel Macron, 
who in the first round received 24.01% and became the unquestioned win-
ner in the second. What seems especially interesting is the fact that not 
only did the FN have powerful representation on regional councils, but 
managed to receive 24.9% of the votes in the elections to the European 
Parliament in 2014 (see: Résultats des élections européennes, 2014).
In the Netherlands, right-wing populism found a strong representation 
in the Party of Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) which has been 
guided since the moment of its foundation in 2008 by Geert Wilders. The 
party manifesto contains some typical elements of right-wing collectiv-
ist populism, such as the necessity to secure health care and an effective 
pension policy for native Dutch citizens, limitation of immigration, help 
for the Afrikaners, withdrawal from the EU, national solidarity and the 
necessity of supporting the biblical tradition as the cultural mainstream 
in the country (this option can be generally considered Judeo-Christian 
since the PVV has a few Jewish supporters, or activists even, such as 
Gidi Markuszower). The first, and most important point in the party’s 
manifesto, however, lies in the belief that the supposed Islamic threat 
can be neutralized (see: Conzept Verkiezinksprogramma PVV 2017–2021, 
2017, p. 1). The anti-Islamic line in Wilder’s views is probably expressed 
most clearly in his famous documentary Fitna, which brought him world 
fame.
The election results of the PVV have not been bad so far. The party 
gained 15.45% in 2010, 10.08% in 2012 and 13.1% in 2017. The dynam-
ics seem similar to that of the Front National in France, where – after 
a temporary decline – popularity began to grow again (see: Uitslag van de 
verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer van 15 maart 2017, p. 9).
A specific case of European populism is right-wing separatism, repre-
sented in an interesting way in Italy by the Northern League (Lega Nord 
per l’Indipendenza della Padania), which was founded as an alliance 
of several regional movements in 1989, and as a party in 1991 by Um-
berto Bossi, the previous leader of Lega Lombarda. The LN’s ideology 
is much more libertarian than those of the previously mentioned move-
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ments; it includes such imperatives as the promotion of small businesses, 
limited government, political and fiscal federalism, low taxation, reduc-
tion of pan-Italian solidarity (cf. Jori, 2009, pp. 77ff.). On the other hand, 
Lega Nord concentrated its efforts on the preservation of the Northern 
traditions and on micro-identities. That is why LN’s doctrinal orientation 
was quite vague. As correctly emphasized by Ignazi (2008, pp. 87ff.), its 
adherents represented a wide range of trends stretching from communism 
to Christian democracy. Its populism boils down to anti-immigrant, anti-
establishment and anti-monopolistic positions.
LN is neither Euro-skeptical nor Euro-enthusiastic, rejecting a bu-
reaucratic macro-state, but proposing the idea of Europe as a continent 
of autonomous regions instead. In the international sphere the Northern 
League seeks supporters in various places. As in the case of the Freedom 
Party of Austria, the present leader of Lega Nord, Matteo Salvini, signed 
an agreement with United Russia. The Kremlin’s intentions were visibly 
analogical, whereas LN explicitly supported Crimea’s right for regional 
self-determination (cf. Seddon, 2017).
A similar case of a separatist party is the Vlaams Belang (previously 
Vlaams Blok) in Belgium. VB is a representation of frustrated Flemish 
nationalists which was officially founded in 2004 but in fact goes back to 
the tradition of the People’s Union of the late 1970s. The ideology of the 
VB, expressed in the party’s manifesto (Programma, 2017) declares the 
European character of Flanders, the necessity to withdraw from Belgium 
(which is supposed to become a paradise for people seeking asylum) and 
a strong rejection of immigration, especially from Muslim countries. The 
popularity of the party (at least if one considers the number of seats taken 
in the federal Chamber of Representatives) has been dropping since 2003 
(2003, p. 18, 2007, p. 17, 2010, p. 12, 2014, p. 3), which does not fit the 
pan-European scheme. However, this can be explained by the fact that the 
Flemish separatist electorate concentrates much more on another nation-
alist party, the New Flemish Alliance (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, N-VA) 
founded in 2001 by Geert Burgeois, and led later by Bart de Wever. The 
manifesto of this national/regional conservative party is both consistent 
and moderate and creates a more realistic perspective of a “civilized” 
secession. That is why the N-VA steals Flemish votes, winning more and 
more seats in the lower house of parliament (2003: 1, 2007: 5, 2010:27, 
2014: 33). The ideological line of the party is an attempt to combine Flem-
ish regionalism with modern EU standards, which resembles the direction 
taken by Lega Nord.
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Another example of a right-wing-populist party oriented toward the 
defense of the interests of only one ethnic group in a multiethnic state is 
the National People’s Front (Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο, ELAM) in Cyprus. 
ELAM was founded in 2008; its ideology is clearly explained in a number 
of publications and interviews given by its leaders, including its chairman, 
Christos Christou. According to these sources, ELAM is a strictly nation-
alistic, ethnically Greek-oriented party, which resorts in its ideology both 
to radical or traditionalistic European philosophers, including Nietzsche 
or Herder, and, obviously, to Greek nationalistic thought, e.g. to Perikles 
Giannopoulos. According to its leaders, there is no need to avoid “tribal” 
argumentation, which is able to explain the glory or misery of particular 
cultures. ELAM wants to halt Islamic, especially Turkish immigration into 
the European circle. The same bias refers to the fading Turkish plans to join 
or to deepen its integration in the EU (see: Thesis, 2017). The party’s popu-
larity, although still insignificant, shows positive signs of growing.
What seems interesting is the fact that on the Greek ethnic mainland 
another nationalistic party – The Independent Greeks (Ανεξάρτητοι 
Έλληνες, ANEL), which obtained 10 parliamentary seats in the 2015 
election, renewed its coalition with SYRIZA (a coalition of radical lefts). 
ANEL, with Panos Kammenos at its head represents more the economic 
orientation of rightist populism, demanding war reparations from Ger-
many and reduction of foreign debt. For ANEL, Greece was trapped by 
the financial institutions and treated by the IMF and the EU as a guinea 
pig. That is why the paradoxical anti-liberal and anti-globalist coalition 
with SYRIZA became reality in 2015. Nordsieck (2015) is probably right 
in describing ANEL as a “national conservative”/“social conservative” 
party. Between 2012 and 2015, despite its share in the governing coalition 
the importance of Independent Greeks was decreasing.
In Denmark, anti-immigrant rightist positions are presented by the 
Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF). It was founded in 1995 
as an emanation of the Progress Party. The DF rejects the possibility of 
multiculturalism in Denmark, and is especially sensitive to the Muslim 
question. Although it is not typically euro-skeptical, the DF does not ac-
cept the perspective of joining the eurozone and is quite careful about the 
possible accession of new EU members, consistently rejecting the idea of 
Turkey’s membership. The DF’s attitude to some foreign policy matters 
seems slightly divergent, since the party does not support the recognition 
of Kosovo, and wishes to renew diplomatic relations with the Republic of 
China in Taiwan at the same time (see: Nores Danmark, 2017).
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In Central Europe, right-wing populist tendencies are manifested 
both in the libertarian version and in the collectivist ideology. Libertarian 
thinking predominated in the manifestos of such Polish parties as The 
Real Politics Union (Unia Polityki Realnej), founded in 1990, The 
Congress of the New Right (Kongres Nowej Prawicy, 2010) and Lib-
erty (Wolność, 2015, formerly: KORWiN). The libertarian tradition in 
Poland owes a lot to Mirosław Dzielski (1941–1989), a moderate aca-
demic theoretician. The new forms of Polish libertarianism, associated 
mainly with MEP Janusz Korwin-Mikke, present a more aggressive posi-
tion, which includes such elements as the total rejection of the EU, or the 
restitution of capital punishment (see: Dumna, bogata Polska. Program 
Partii KORWiN, 2017).
Alt-right populism is present in the manifestos of some Polish par-
ties and movements, including the national-conservative Law and Jus-
tice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) (which is concerned about such ideas as 
faithfulness to traditional values, the rebirth of patriotism among the 
younger generation, a strong national economy and reluctance to any in-
flow of Muslim refugees), but far more in the relatively blurry ideology 
of Kukiz’15, which was founded just before the parliamentary elections 
in the fall of 2015 by Paweł Kukiz, a popular rock singer. The party’s 
strategy aims at the achievement of such imperatives as an independent 
“national” economy, national control over the country’s future, low and 
“just” taxes, the limitation of the influence of international corporations. 
However, Kukiz’15 does not suggest any form of withdrawal from the 
EU, emphasizing only the necessity of criticism about overregulation, 
and of a realistic attitude to Polish foreign policy (see: Strategia zmiany, 
2015).
A much more striking example of right-wing populism is the Hungar-
ian Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Moz-
galom), a nationalistic party officially founded in 2002 (at the same time 
as the Right-Wing Youth Association) by Gergely Pongrátz, a veteran of 
the 1956 revolution. Jobbik’s vision of Europe is not Euro-skeptical, but 
focused on the idea of a community of free and sovereign nations. On top 
of that, Jobbik is highly sensitive to the situation of compatriots in neigh-
boring countries, demanding the application of European norms to the 
minorities in Slovakia, Romania and Serbia. The party manifesto also fo-
cuses on such problems as special measures against corruption, providing 
equal opportunities for Hungarian firms in competition with international 
companies, abandoning the EU talks on TTIP, and giving preferences to 
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family farms instead of promoting large estates owned by oligarchs (see: 
Policies, 2017).
The popularity of the party shows an upward trend: it gained only 
2.2% of the popular vote in 2002, but 16.67% in 2010 and 20.22% in 
2014. However, according to Századvég’s poll in February 2017, Job-
bik’s popularity was at a level of 19% whereas the right-conservative 
Fidesz conducted by Viktor Orbán expected 49% (see: Party Preferences 
in Hungary among the Total Population, 2017).
In Germany, the most influential EU member, rightist populism has 
been represented since 1964 by the nationalistic and xenophobic Nation-
al Democratic Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, 
NPD), whose manifesto focuses on making Germany an ethnically Ger-
man country again. The party is oriented toward a strong, far more milita-
rized state. As in the case of nearly all rightist populists, the NPD demands 
that the economy be subordinated to national interests rather than to the 
rules of globalization. The policies ought to focus on traditional families, 
so Germany should become a welfare state with regional and economic 
microsystems. Non-citizens should be excluded from social programs, in 
accordance with the main imperative, which is Germany for the Germans, 
within a Europe defined as a community of nations (“Das Europa der 
Völker”) (see: Arbeit. Familie. Vaterland. Parteiprogram, 2017, pp. 5, 
6–8, 13).
The NPD, however, which is perceived as a Nazi threat in a country 
with a totalitarian past, is not necessarily a convenient option for the cir-
cles which are afraid of denationalization on the one hand and of being 
accused of renazification, on the other. The nationalists have never won 
a seat in the Bundestag; in 2014 they managed to send one deputy to the 
European Parliament. What seems to be much more promising is the Al-
ternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD), which was 
founded in February 2013 by Alexander Gauland and Berndt Lucke as 
Electoral Alternative 2013. The AfD is much less nationalistic, accepting 
the project of the EU but without a common currency. The party’s mani-
festo does not accept the vision of Europe as a federal macro-state, but as 
a community of sovereign countries.
Like the NPD, the AfD is rather conservative in the social sphere, 
opposing non-traditional family policies that would accept homosexual 
marriages or an unfriendly attitude to “full-time mothers.” The main topic 
of the AfD’s interest, however, is the problem of immigration, especially 
from Muslim countries. The AfD rejects double citizenship, mass inflow 
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of refugees from abroad, unjustified asylum, reducing the meaning of in-
tegration to proper command of German, and so on.
The ideas on foreign policy in the AfD manifesto would lead to weak-
ening the ties inside NATO, which is perceived only as a defensive alli-
ance. The AfD stands for better relations with Russia and rejects the idea 
of a European army (Programm, 2017).
The AfD, regardless of its short history, enjoyed greater popularity 
than any other populist movement in Germany. Under the leadership of 
Frauke Petry and Jörg Meuthen the party managed to achieve 4.7% in the 
popular vote to the Federal Assembly (the Bundestag) missing the 5% 
barrier by a hair’s breadth. In 2014, the AfD won 7 seats in the European 
Parliament and by May 2017 turned out to be quite successful in several 
regional elections. The best result was achieved in Saxony-Anhalt, win-
ning 25 seats out of 87 (see: Cantow, Fehndrich, Zicht, 2016).
The unquestionable success of the AfD can be explained by its relative 
moderateness compared to some cases of European right-wing radical-
ism, such as the NPD or Pegida (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Is-
lamisierung des Abendlandes, Eng. Patriotic Europeans Against the 
Islamisation of the West). Pegida, which was founded in 2014 by Lutz 
Bachmann in Dresden, enjoys some popularity not only in Germany but 
in several other countries as well, including Poland, where Muslim immi-
grants are practically non-existent. Pegida describes itself as a moderate 
rightist movement, concerned about the preservation of national Euro-
pean cultures and averting radicalism. That is why it suggests an immi-
gration policy strictly combined with demographic objectives. In terms 
of economy, Pegida is oriented toward independent state policies, which 
ought to replace the dictatorship of global agreements. It is also radically 
pro-Russian and stands for the abolition of sanctions (Programm, 2017, 
Pegida).
Possibly the most successful right-wing-populist movement in the EU 
(not because of its presence in the governmental structures but rather due 
to the achievement of the main idea) is the United Kingdom Independ-
ence Party. It managed to win 24 out of 73 seats in the British share 
of the EP in the elections of 2016, but only one seat (despite 12.6% in 
overall vote) in the election to the House of Commons in 2014. The elec-
tion of 2016 turned out to be only a prelude to the Brexit referendum (the 
United Kingdom European Union membership referendum) held on June 
23, 2016. UKIP was founded in 1993 by Alan Sked, leader of the Anti-
Federalist League.
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There is no controversy about the populist character of the UKIP. 
Abedi & Lundberg (2007) describe such phenomena as AEP (Anti-Es-
tablishment Parties). The paradoxical course of their actions places them 
within the scheme of Pareto’s theory of the circulation of elites: having 
achieved their goals, the counter-elites become a new generation of elites, 
which deprives them of their previous mission. UKIP does not have a co-
herent manifesto and its political line can be deduced from its 5 Pledges: 
“cut immigration, a more secure Britain, NHS before foreign aid, protect-
ing British culture, modern & fair democracy,” interviews, speeches and, 
probably most convincing, from the manifestos prepared for the main re-
gions of the UK. Their main concern is hardly a surprise: “Britain’s policy 
of open borders has caused house prices to skyrocket, social services to 
become strained and left parents struggling to find school places for their 
children” (see: UKIP London Manifesto, 2016).
The above list of right-wing populist organizations and movements 
is by no means complete, but hopefully partly representative. Right-
wing populism is certainly not restricted to the area of the US, or of the 
European Union. Such phenomena as the Swiss People’s Party (Sch-
weizerische Volkspartei, SVP, Partida populara Svizra, PPS) led by 
Albert Rösti or the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (Liberalno-
Demokraticheskaya Partiya Rossii) founded and led by Vladimir Zhiri-
novsky fall under the label in a similar way.
Common Ideological Structure of New Right-wing Populism
A synthetic view of the leading right-wing-populist movements within 
the Western world helps to draw a modest list of common imperatives:
1. Opening the country’s borders to migration poses a serious threat to 
social stability, especially to cultural identity, health care, internal se-
curity and the labor market.
2. States are encountering a flood of international economic pressures; 
the sovereignty of states is questioned by international corporations, 
which deprive nations of their possessions. People lose jobs and 
production is transferred to tax havens or to countries with cheap 
labor.
3. EU bureaucracy (as well as the federal US administration) is an ex-
pensive, artificial and parasitic creation that imposes regulations on 
states and citizens, caring for the interests of Big Finance instead of 
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the benefit of nations. We need a more limited but efficient govern-
ment to meet the expectations of our times.
4. There is an urgent need to return American and European politics back 
to the people, who ought to assert their needs and distance themselves 
from denationalized and selfish elites.
5. There is no need to keep the liberal positions in foreign policy. Sanc-
tions against Russia are questionable, we need a new opening in the 
relations with a strong and conservative partner, which was successful 
in fighting Islamic extremism.
Rational Grounds of Right-wing Populism
Trying to establish whether the right-wing populist specter which is 
haunting Europe and the United States has any rational grounds, at least 
six issues can be mentioned:
1. The growing number of immigrants. According to Migration Watch 
UK (2017), a significant growth of the immigration rate in Britain has 
been observed for decades, with the greatest jump after 2012. The 
migration rate was actually negative between 1975 and 1982, but after 
that period there was continual growth. In 2015, the number of immi-
grants exceeded 300,000. In September 2016, the net migration index 
was –56,000 for British citizens, +165,000 for incomers from other 
EU member states and +164,000 for immigrants from non-European 
countries. In many other European countries, including Germany, 
France, Austria, the Netherlands and Hungary, the trends are not very 
different, which is a result of the inflow of real or fake refugees after 
the Arab Spring.
2. The increase of national debt, which is discussed in almost all west-
ern countries but most vigorously in the US. According to the US Debt 
Clock, by spring 2017 the USA’s debt reached $19.9 trillion. The most 
dynamic growth of the debt took place after 2008, and the high dy-
namics have been continued ever since. Also, the US budget deficit is 
growing reaching $176 billion in March 2017 (see: Monthly Budget 
Review for April, 2017).
3. Expanding bureaucracy. Criticism of expanding bureaucracy is be-
coming more and more common both in the US and in Europe. The 
general conclusion is that the Parkinson Law is entirely confirmed, 
especially in the case of the Brussels administration. As British Influ-
74 Joachim Diec ŚSP 4 ’17
ence (2015, p. 5) analysts point out: “The EU budget is wasted on EU 
bureaucracy and administration” paying more than 55,000 civil serv-
ants.
4. The growing impact of globalization, which causes several new phe-
nomena in world business such as offshoring and outsourcing. There 
is no doubt that these tendencies cause social dumping, a phenomenon 
which has already been studied in reliable research (cf. Bernaciak et 
al., 2015), and foster migrant labor (cf. Drahokoupil, 2015, p. 20).
5. Increasing crime rate and a flood of terrorist attacks. The recent years 
saw an outbreak of highly dangerous phenomena. In 2016 alone, Eu-
ropeans were provided with good arguments for resentment, because 
of such terrorist attacks as the explosion in Brussels airport in March, 
the Nice truck attack in July, or the truck raid on the Berlin Christmas 
market in December. Almost all terrorist attacks were associated with 
Islamic fundamentalism.
6. Last but not least, the negative demographic tendencies, which in 
the states of the West cause more and more acute consequences: the 
necessity of immigration and decreasing productivity. These fatal 
syndromes refer to nearly all European nations including the leading 
economies. As Stratfor analysts point out, “In the long term, Germa-
ny’s demographic outlook will challenge its trade surplus and position 
as creditor” since Germany will “not have a trade surplus by around 
2030 due to decreased exports (resulting from lower productivity) and 
growing imports by retirees” (Stratfor, 2012). Another problem is the 
growing percentage of Muslims in European societies. Although it is 
generally difficult to estimate, according to academic studies, we can 
generally say that the percentage has grown now to about 6% from 
1950 when it was less than 2% (see: Kettani, 2010, p. 154).
Conclusions
The presented overview of right-wing populist movements in the US 
and in the European Union, as well as the abstraction of right-wing popu-
list imperatives and of the facts that lie behind social attitudes, confirms 
the dual character of contemporary rightist populism. On the one hand, it 
expresses the libertarian principle of individual freedom and limited gov-
ernment. This model of rightist populism prevails in the United States, 
which has been confirmed by the results of the elections to the House of 
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Representatives, to the Senate and, above all, in the recent presidential 
election.
However, the libertarian tendency is contaminated in the US by right-
alt collectivist ideas with the predominating cultural component. This 
point of view is more typical of the European stage, where social security 
and ethnic purity became much more important than the idea of unlimited 
freedom on the one hand and limited government on the other. The reason 
for this divergence may boil down to the differences in historical experi-
ence and in the range of the Islamic threat.
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Morfologia prawicowego populizmu w USA i Unii Europejskiej 
 
Streszczenie
Prawicowy populizm w Stanach Zjednoczonych i Unii Europejskiej jest jed-
nym z wiodących trendów ich politycznej rzeczywistości. Stąd istnieje konieczność 
ustrukturyzowania wiedzy na temat tego zjawiska poprzez wyszczególnienie jego 
głównych wskaźników i wyjaśnienie ich przyczyn. Do głównych jego determinant 
należą wrogość wobec imigracji, postrzeganie wielonarodowych firm jako zagrożenie 
dla lokalnych rynków pracy, postulat redukcji biurokracji, antyelitaryzm, odmienne 
rozumienie polityki międzynarodowej połączone z nowym otwarciem w stosunkach 
z Rosją.
Różnorakie ruchy populistyczne wynikają z kilku czynników, takich jak znaczny 
wzrost imigracji w Europie, narastanie długu publicznego, wszechogarniająca biuro-
kracja, poważne znaczenie międzynarodowych korporacji, powódź ataków terrory-
stycznych lub negatywne tendencje demograficzne.
Ideologię właściwego populizmu można odnieść do dwóch różnych tradycji: do 
indywidualistycznego libertarianizmu (który częściowo determinuje ideologię Tea 
Party i niektórych innych ruchów amerykańskich) oraz do prawicowego, kolektywi-
stycznego, plemiennego tradycjonalizmu, bardziej powszechnego na Starym Konty-
nencie.
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